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PREFACE
In the international law of expropriation, the principle which is
most often applied is the territoriality principle. The case law of the
United States and Western European countries is based upon it. Al-
though there are nuances in individual cases which are partly due to
historical developments (and the result of the more or less practical
experience of a country's citizens with foreign expropriations), there





In Germany the term "territoriality principle" (Gebietsgrundsatz)
has several meanings. Generally the term conveys the idea that the
legal consequences which flow from state action are effective only
within the territory of the acting state.
However, the expression has different meanings in different con-
texts. The term "territoriality principle" acts much like a veil covering
the real subject matter. The principle is applied to limit the effect of
acts of state where a state seeks to enforce judicially an expropriation
act against property located in another state. In such cases it would be
better for a court to say, for example, that "expropriations will be rec-
ognized only if and to the extent that the expropriating state stays
within the limits of its power." One could then dispense with the vague
expression "territoriality principle," just as in the field of private inter-
national law one strives to avoid using the amorphous term "qualifica-
tion" to aid in certainty and predictability.
B. The International Law of Intellectual Property
The international law of industrial property is based primarily on
the territoriality principle. Each state decides questions involving the
origin, content, protection, transfer and loss of patents, trademarks,
etc., but such decisions are effective only within its territory.' While
property and every other private law right are, in accordance with pri-
vate international law, either valid everywhere or not valid at all
(thereby forming a single legal right), a patent, if it is valid in several
states, constitutes in accordance with the international law of industrial
property a "bundle" of rights each of which is valid in a single state.
If there also exists a bundle of defacto rights in private interna-
tional law because each state has its own private international law, such
a bundle of intellectual property rights exists defjure in international
law because every state's conflict of laws rules divide trademark and
patent rights on a state-by-state basis. To adopt a descriptive illustra-
I. See, e-g., E. ULMER, DIE IMMATERIALGOTERRECHTE IM INTERNATIONALEN PRI-
VATRECHT (1975) [hereinafter cited as IPR]; Neuhaus, Drobnig, von Hoffmann, & Martiny,
Die Immaterialgferrechle im kiinftigen IPR der Europfaischen Gemeinschaften, 40 RABELS
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 189 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as RABELSZ]; Ulmer, Gewerbliche Schutzrechte and Urheberrechte im IPR, 41
RABELSZ 479 (1977); Troller, Neu belebte Diskussion Fber des IPR im Bereich des Immateri-
algiterrechis, PROBLEMI ATTUALI DI DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE, STUDI CELEBRATIVI DEL XXV
ANNO DELLA RIVISTA DI DiRTro INDUSTRIALE 1125 (1977).
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tion from English legal history:2 in private international law the cake is
passed around, while in the international law of intellectual property it
is divided up. The "bundle" theory is derived from the fact that the
protection of intellectual property originally depended on a grant (in
the nature of a privilege) from the state.3 At this point the rules of
conflict of laws come to a halt, just as the conflicts rules outlasted the
substantive laws of the division of hereditary estates.4
Justifiably, the "bundle" theory has been both attacked and de-
fended. It is anchored in a network of international treaties, e.g., the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,5 the Bern
Convention on the Protection of Works of Literature and Art,6 and the
World Patent Law Convention.7 Not much damage is being done to
the "bundle" theory by the European Economic Community; it has cre-
ated a uniform patent in the (not yet effective) Luxembourg Conven-
tion on the European Patent for the Common Market (Community
Patent) of December 1, 1975.8 Because of the "bundle" theory, foreign
industrial property rights may be claimed in domestic litigation only on
a "preliminary question," as when a domestic complaint for damages is
based on a violation of a foreign patent abroad. Other unique
problems are posed by this theory, especially for trademarks involving
"parallel imports."9
Fortunately, the "bundle" theory needs no discussion here because
the territoriality principle serves both the private interests of individu-
als and especially the interest of communication in the area of intellec-
tual property law.'" In contrast, public international law is concerned
with state interests.
2. See A. SIMPSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 82 (1961)
for several examples of how the fee simple may be divided in the law of estates.
3. E. ULMER, supra note 1, at 9.
4. G. KEGEL, IPR 183-185 (4th ed. 1977).
5. Translated from the German Verbandsilbereinkunft zum Schutz des gewerblichen
Eigentums.
6. Translated from the German 6ibereinkunft zum Schutze von Werken der Literatur
and Kunst.
7. Translated from the German Welturheberrechtsabkommen.
8. Translated from the German 6ibereinkommen tiber das europiische Patent.fr den
Gemeinsamen Markt (Gemeinschaftspatent).
9. H. SOERGEL, W. SIEBERT & G. KEGEL, 7 BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] (W.
Ger.), Einf-hrungsgesetz zum biirgerllchen Gesetzbuche [EGBGB], art. 7, at 306 n.7 (10th ed.
1970).
10. Troller, supra note 1, at 1128-32.
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C. Public International Law
In this domain the territoriality principle does not mean that with
regard to the interests of a private party subjective private rights consti-
tute a bundle of rights effective at any given time in a single territory
("the cake is divided up"). Rather, in public international law, the ter-
ritoriality principle means that certain types of state action (statutes,
administrative acts, judicial decisions) which directly serve to advance
state interests are generally effective only within the territory of the act-
ing state.
State action of this type includes statutes, administrative acts, and




- protection of the environment
- tax and customs matters
- social insurance
- criminal law
- the economy, especially state interference with the exercise of pri-
vate rights by:
- expropriation
- exchange and currency regulations
- foreign trade regulations and
- to a certain extent by enforcement of anti-trust laws.
I. THE BASIS OF THE TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE
IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Citizen and Territory
The state is an association of persons or citizens within a territory
which (as the most intensive social grouping, as a life-supporting and
defensive entity) serves to further the welfare and security of all; this is
the purpose or at least the main purpose of a state. The state is able to
accomplish this purpose by requiring individuals to sacrifice at least
some of their freedom and property (the instrumentalities of the state)
in order to be able to act legislatively, administratively and judicially.
Apart from general principles of the law of nations and the Char-
ter of the United Nations, the state is free, ie., it is subject to no other
state. It obeys no commands and categorically refuses to accept any
judgment of its conduct: it is "sovereign" (supremus).
What the state claims unilaterally for itself, it universally concedes
No. 2]
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to other states: all states are "equal" (as expressed in the maxim "one
state-one vote" evidenced in the United Nations General Assembly).
Other states are bound to respect the domestic order of a state and must
restrain themselves from interfering in its internal affairs."
Thus Section I of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, 12 in declaring the principles guiding relations
between participating states, makes reference to the mutual respect of
sovereign equality and individuality as well as all the rights inherent
and encompassed therein, "including in particular the right of every
state to juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and
political independence."' 3
As an "effective political unit""'4 each state advances only the in-
terests of its own citizens and not those of the citizens of other states,
for example, granting the right to vote and affording diplomatic protec-
tion only to its own citizens. The state promotes the interests of its
citizens primarily within its own territory. "Territory and population"
traditionally have been the principal constituent parts of a state.
15
B. Citizen and Territory in the Law of Nations and Private
International Law
The personal and territorial sovereignty of states formerly domi-
nated extensive parts of the law of nations.' 6 Private international law
was supported by the real and personal statute (statuapersonalia et re-
alia) from the Middle Ages to the nineteenth century. These statutes
left their after-effects in:
- the "Italian School" of the nineteenth century, which drew. a dis-
tinction between legal norms which served private interests (and
were taken from the law of the state to which the individual be-
longed) and "ordre public," or legal norms, derived exclusively
from the state's own law;
- Zitelmann's system, which deduced the rules of private intema-
11. For a complete discussion, see Mosler, ilkerrecht als Rechtsordnung, 36 ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND V6LKERRECHT 6, 15-17, 22-26,
28, 37-39 (1976).
12. Translated from the German Konferenz aber Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in
Europa.
13. Mosler, supra note 11, at 16 n.18.
14. Id at 26.
15. R. Schmidt-Wiegand, Land und Leute, 2 HANDW6RTERBUCH ZUR DEUTSCHEN
RECHTSGESCHICHTE 1362-63 (1976); M. KRIELE, EINFYHRUNG IN DIE STAATSLEHRE 94-103
(1975). One can even dip into behavioral research for examples of how groups defend their
own territory; see R. ARDREY, THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE (1966).
16. I. SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, V6LKERRECHT 189-235 (3d ed. 1975).
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tional law from the personal and territorial sovereignty of the law
of nations;
- Pillet's division into "loispermanentes," which protect the indi-
vidual and have extraterritorial effect, and "lois generales," which
serve to protect society and have only internal territorial
applicability;
- Batiffol's categorization of legal norms into those on the one hand
which seem to promote private interests and therefore deserve to
be respected even if foreign, and into those on the other hand
which further the general interests of society and above al the
state;
- Kegel's differentiation among the interests represented by the
concepts of "party," "communication," and "powers."
17
C. State Welfare and Justice Between Individuals
The state promotes the welfare and security of all of its citizens
within its territory, distinguishing itself from other states which do the
same for their own citizens on their own soil. However, the state not
only selfishly promotes the welfare and security of its own citizens, 1 e.,
its own interest or the welfare of the state, but also selflessly, as a pa-
tron, strives for justice between all individuals, and not just between its
own citizens. To the extent that the state selfishly promotes its own
interests, the other states will respect it within the boundaries of its
power, where it has a free hand. The cake is divided up.
To the extent that the state selflessly strives for justice between in-
dividuals, the other states will respect it universally and without limita-
tion. Its power has nothing to do with whether its acts will be
recognized and its laws applied by other states; these are questions
which will rather be decided by the substantive and procedural princi-
ples of private international law. Justice: the cake is passed around.
Insofar as the state promotes its own welfare, one can speak of
"power" and, to the extent that the state strives to promote justice be-
tween individuals, of "justice."'" However, the state also uses power to
do justice for individuals (e.g., by executing judgments); justice has its
role to play in public law as well, for example, justice in taxation and in
social insurance (at least relative justice, assuming one accepts the fair-
ness of tax and social insurance payments).
17. G. KEGEL, supra note 4, at 7, 56-59, 64-67, 89-91.
18. Kegel, The Crfisin the Conflict ofLaws, 112 R.ECUEIL DES COURS 1191, 181 (1964).
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D. State Power
Together with the concepts of "citizen" and "territory," one should
also examine the concept of "state authority."19  State authority is
power. Similar to the concept of "de facto possession" found in the law
of property (e.g., in § 854(I) of the German Civil Code),2" power is the
preponderant probability of being able to enforce one's will. This
probability is even more important than actual enforcement, since
power (like strength) is depleted when used.2"
Other states respect the power of a state as long as it acts within its
own territory.22 This is the meaning of the territoriality principle in
public international law.
E. The Application of Foreign Public Law
It is consistent with and often required by the concept of justice
between individuals that private substantive legal relations are some-
times governed by foreign law (private international law). However,
the welfare of a state, its individuality, generally precludes it from pro-
moting the welfare of a foreign state by applying the state's public law.
Each state thus basically applies only its own public law (public inter-
national law).
To be sure, there is a unanimous agreement today not that foreign
public law is never applicable but rather that it is basically inapplica-
ble.23 Thus foreign public law may be applied:
- in cases involving the recognition of foreign judicial decisions
dealing with private law claims. Recognition arguably means the
application of foreign law. Factors to be considered include for-
eign legal norms governing the jurisdiction of the court, the way
the proceedings went, the finality of the judgment (the law of civil
procedure; non-contentious jurisdiction; and to a lesser extent,
bankruptcy);
- in cases involving the private law claims of foreign states in order
to determine who is authorized to exercise these rights for the
foreign state;
- in questions of whether the applicable norms of foreign private
19. M. KRIELE, supra note 15, at 84-99.
20. Kegel, Von wilden Tieren, zerstreuten Leuten und versunkenen Schiffien, FESTSCHRIFT
FOR ERNST VON CAEMMERER 149-78 (1978).
21. N. LUHMANN, MACHT 61(1975).
22. See §§ I.C. and II.F. of this Article.
23. See Mann, Conflict of Laws andPublic Law, 132 RECUEIL DES COURS I, 107, 182-96
(1971); Seidl-Hohenveldern, Die Voraussetzungenfr die Anwendbarkeit ausliandischen affent-
lichen Rechtes, 25 REVISTA ESPAf4OLA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 349 (1972).
[Vol. 5
The Territoriality Principle
law (and the applicable norms of foreign public law) were validly
enacted;
- in questions (e.g., in private international law) of whether a per-
son is a national of a particular foreign state.
One should add to this list the cases in which although foreign
public law is not applied, it is nevertheless effective as a fact ("local
datum") in the application of domestic legal norms, as when a foreign
economic boycott of an enemy is not applied but makes performance
by the debtor impossible.
In addition, foreign public law is at least partially applied in cases
involving the recognition of foreign state interference with the exercise
of private rights. In cases like these the territoriality principle applies
to encroachments designed to promote the political and economic goals
of the foreign state. 4
For certain matters there are rules which provide for limited appli-
cability of foreign public law, e.g., since the Middle Ages in the area of
international criminal law.' When foreign public law is otherwise ap-
plicable is currently the subject of controversy.26
F. State Interference in the Exercise of Private Rights
Encroachments by the state into the field of private law may be
designed to accomplish various purposes. Foreign state encroachments
enforcing private law rights (such as intervention by the execution of
judgments or bankruptcy) which also serve individual interests will be
more readily recognized (and as norms of foreign public law, more
readily applied) than state encroachments which promote political or
economic goals. Such goals as expropriation or restrictions on the cir-
culation of money through currency regulations are directed toward
promoting the welfare of the state itself.
Since every state basically promotes only its own welfare, e.g., the
welfare of its own citizens, and does not serve foreign states or their
citizens, it need not recognize foreign state encroachments in the area
24. See § II.F. of this Article.
25. Legros, Leprincioe de la territorialitk du droitpknal, RAPPORTS BELGES AU VIIIE
CONGRs INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARE (Brussels) 737-60 (Pescara 29 aolt-5
septembre 1970); Schwander, Das Territorialitalsprinzp im schweizer/schen Strafrecht,
RECUEIL DE TRAVAUX SUISSES PRI-SENTL AU VIii CONGRES INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT
COMPARP, 365 (Basel 1970); Oehler, Das Territorialftisprinzp, DEUTSCHE STRAFRECHT-
LICHE LANDESREFERATE ZUM VIII. INTERNATIONALEN KONGRESS FfiR RECHTSVER-
GLEICHUNG 48-76 (1971); D. OEHLER, INTERNATIONALES STRAFRECHT, 52-125, 151-276
(1973).
26. See § III.B. of this Article.
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of private law at all where such intervention is motivated by the desire
to achieve political or economic goals. The same non-recognition pol-
icy could be applied to the foreign public law norms on which the en-
croachments are based.
From this, one may conclude that "sovereign" states are independ-
ent of one another, i e., they cannot order each other around; they can-
not interfere in each other's internal affairs,27 and other states may not,
in the absence of consent, be required to appear before foreign courts
(at least not in matters involving acts iuris imperii as distinguished from
iuris gestionis). But these ideas would only be effective in preventing
foreign state interference in the exercise of private rights when the en-
croaching state attempts to enforce its action outside its own territory,
as when a foreign state expropriates property located in another state.
On the other hand these theories would not adequately justify refusal
to recognize foreign state encroachments in the area of private law
where such interventions are limited to the territory of the encroaching
state, as when the foreign state expropriates property located within its
territory. But even here a state may withhold recognition because it
moves according to its own political and economic policies and does
not serve the interests of foreign states. Even if it is deemed necessary
in such cases to recognize the foreign state intervention, the recognizing
state is free to adopt its own diametrically opposed intervention. For
example, the state may retake the expropriated property as soon as it
arrives within its territory and give it back to its original owner.
The recognition of foreign state encroachment into the area of pri-
vate law is thus an expression of recognizing a state's own political or
economic policy. However, at times circumstances are such that it is in
a state's own interest to recognize foreign state interference in the exer-
cise of private rights. If expropriations carried out in the expropriating
state are not recognized abroad, this could lead to an interruption of
commercial relations and perhaps even war between the states con-
cerned. There is thus an interest in international order which some-
times argues in favor of the recognition of foreign state interference in
the exercise of private rights.
The line of demarcation between recognized and non-recognized
state encroachments on private rights, in particular between recognized
and non-recognized foreign expropriations, is drawn voluntarily (and
not because required by law) by a state's taking into account power
relationships, thereby elevating might to the rank of right. Just as the
27. See § II.A. of this Article.
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"sovereign" state remains lord of its own domain, it concedes the same
attributes of "sovereignty" to other states. Whenever a foreign state
remains within the territorial limits of its power, its encroachment into
the area of private law will be recognized by other states.
Since power is the preponderant probability of being able to en-
force one's will,28 and since enforcement necessarily requires authority
(through the enforcement mechanisms of the courts, the police, and the
military), and since this authority may only be exercised within the
state's territory,29 it follows that the territoriality principle should be
applied to foreign state encroachment on private rights, especially
through expropriation.
The territoriality principle stands out with particular clarity in
cases involving state interference with tangible personalty. When prop-
erty is located within a state's territory, the state can invoke the direct
use of authority, even employing physical force to take the property
away from its former owner.
Concerning "incorporeal," invisible, and intangible rights ("res in-
corporales") such as claims, membership rights, trademarks, patents,
etc., there is strictly speaking no situs within a given territory. The de-
marcation lines of power are more difficult to draw here and the territo-
riality principle more awkward to apply.
Thus one can inquire in cases involving the expropriatory extinc-
tion of claims whether the matter should turn on the domicile of the
debtor or on the situs of the personal property and the "situs" of intan-
gible rights of the debtor. In the former case the result is that expropri-
ation by the state of domicile will be recognized abroad, while
expropriation by other states will not. The latter case results in the
expropriation only being effective relative to that property of the debtor
located within the territory of the expropriating state; hence, it is inef-
fective relative to any property the debtor may have abroad.
Similar issues arise concerning the expropriation of membership
rights (e.g., corporate shares). If the outcome depends on the personal
statute of the corporation, ie., the location of the head office of the
corporation or the law of the place of incorporation, expropriation of
membership rights by the state of the personal statute results in the
foreign property of the corporation being turned over to the new mem-
bers. If on the other hand the determination depends on the place
where the personal property of the corporation is located or where the
28. See § II.D. of this Article.
29. See § II.A. of this Article.
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intangible rights of the corporation have their "situs," the result is that
the expropriation of membership rights is only effective against corpo-
rate property located within the expropriating state, but not abroad.
The same problem is posed when a corporation is dissolved by state
action, or when the state acts not in taking property, but rather in as-
suming control over the corporation, as by substituting its own candi-
dates for the board of directors or by installing its own administrators
or supervisors.
In a general way one can equate the situs of personal property and
the "situs" of the intangible rights of the debtor and of the corporation
in the expropriating state or abroad to that of legal relations in the
expropriating state or elsewhere.30 The matter nevertheless almost al-
ways concerns the rights to the expropriated property, and it thus suf-
fices to take the place of the property into consideration.
Two exceptions, however, must be stressed. One is favorable to
recognition; the other is not.
Favorable to recognition: although the expropriating state has
overstepped the bounds of its power, its interference in the exercise of
private rights will be recognized if a given state is pursuing the same
political or economic goals.
Expropriations (followed by compensation) carried out by the
Norwegian and Netherlands governments in exile, and which con-
cerned ships, claims, bank credits and bearer debenture bonds relating
to ships which had their "situs" in either England or the United States
and which belonged to either Norway or the Netherlands, were recog-
nized in England and in the United States.3 To be sure, later retreats
from this position were made in England and in the United States.32 In
France, recognition was granted to the Netherlands' stock expropria-
30. G. KEGEL, supra note 4, at 512. See also Judgment of Dec. 17, 1963,
Bundesgerichtshof [BGHZ] (W. Ger.) (1964) 17 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 650: the
duty imposed by the expropriating state to report the existence of property located abroad
provides no justification for someone living abroad to send letters to the expropriating state
authorities, thereby involving the interested parties in criminal proceedings. See also Judg-
ment of April 14, 1965, BGHZ (1965) 20 Juristenzeitung 680: The press outside the expro-
priating state may call the transferee of the expropropriated property its owner, using the
name belonging to the transferee according to the law of the expropriating state.
31. Lorentzen v. Lydden & Co., [1942] 2 K.B. 202; Anderson v. Transandine Handel-
smaatschappij, 289 N.Y. 9, 43 N.E.2d 502 (1942).
32. Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart v. Slatford, [1951] 1 Ch. 264, 268; Netherlands v.
Federal Reserve Bank, 99 F. Supp. 655 (1951), rev'd in part, 201 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1953);
Note, 79 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 696 (1952).
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tions in revalorization of securities proceedings.3" Because of a com-
mon policy with the West, the United States embargo against the
Eastern Bloc countries was observed in the Federal Republic of
Germany.34
Unfavorable to recognition: although the expropriating state has
kept within the boundaries of its power, its interference in the area of
private law will not be recognized if it offends the public order of a
given state. 5
II. THE AREA OF APPLICABILITY OF THE
TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE
A. The Law of Nations
The territoriality principle for state interference in the exercise of
private rights, especially expropriation, must be deemed to constitute a
rule of international law.36 The real controversy in international law
thus turns on whether, to what extent, and with what consequences ex-
propriations of property located within the expropriating state (thus
about the types of cases in which we are not here interested, ie., where
the expropriating state keeps within the bounds of its power,) constitute
violations of international law.
3 7
Regardless of whether or not it has done so, every state is free to
either recognize or refuse to recognize foreign state encroachments on
private rights.3 8 As useful as it may be to invoke international law in
defending oneself against foreign extraterritorial expropriations, it
33. 93 JOURNAL DU DRorr INTERNATIONAL 631 (1966), with a critical case comment by
Bredin; (1966) D.S. JUR., with a critical case comment by Loussouarn.
34. See Judgment of Dec. 21, 1960, BGHZ (1961) 14 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
822; and Judgment of May 24, 1962, BGHZ (1962) 15 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1436.
Cf. also the Judgment of the Federal Labor Court of Dec. 5, 1969, (1970) 23 Neue Jurist-
ische Wochenschrift 1014: Italian guest workers who went home to put in a tour of compul-
sory military service were entitled to credit for this time in computing their seniority with a
German employer.
35. French case law refuses categorically to recognize uncompensated expropriations
even if the property affected is located within the expropriating state at the time of expropri-
ation. See § IV.B.1. of this Article.
36. Support for this view may be found in W. BIRKE, DIE KONFISKATION
AUSLANDISCHEN PRIVATVERMOGENS IM HOHEITSBEREICH DES KONFISZIERENDEN STAATES
NACH FRIEDENSV6LKERRECHT 21 (1960); B6CKSTIEGEL, BERICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN GE-
SELLSCHAFT FUR VOLKERRECHT 13, 32-34 (1974).
37. I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, Auslindische Nationalisierungsmassnahmen und ihre
Beurteilung durch deutsche Gerichte, 5 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFTSDIENST DES BETRIEBS-BE-
RATERS 272 (1959); W. BIRKE, supra note 36, at 27-30; Bi5CKSTIEGEL, supra note 36, at 35-
40.
38. See § II. F. of this Article.
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should be noted that the non-recognition of foreign state encroach-
ments on private rights which violate the territoriality principle is based
on the national law of the state affected, and not on international law.
B. Public International Law
Every substantive law subject has its own "international" conflicts
rules, i e., a group of legal norms which answer the question of which
state's substantive rules are to apply. Thus, for substantive private law
there exists a private international law with sub-groupings devoted to
the international law of persons, the law of obligations, property law,
family law and laws of succession.
In like manner there exists a public international law. As does
private international law, it forms a part of the legal system of each
state (national law, not the law of nations) and, like private interna-
tional law, it has its subgroupings. For example, there is an interna-
tional administrative law, an international law of taxation, an
international social insurance law and an international criminal law.39
State encroachments on private rights which serve to promote only
public interests (and not, like official judicial action, the enforcement of
private interests) may belong to various subgroupings. Thus, one may
put expropriation in a subgrouping called international administrative
law or perhaps in international economic law, while import and export
prohibitions and currency regulations may be classified under interna-
tional economic law.
While it is fairly clear when foreign public law will be exception-
ally applied to cases involving state encroachments on private rights
and in many other areas as well," much uncertainty exists concerning
the circumstances under which foreign public law may or must be ap-
plied. Many writers tend to be magnanimous on this question.'
Article 7 of the European Economic Community Commission's
preliminary draft of a convention on the law applicable to contracts
and non-contractual obligations42 is so vague that it virtually amounts
to a "non-rule":
39. See § I.C. and II. E. of this Article.
40. See § II. E. and II. F. of this Article.
41. See, e.g., K. Zweigert, Internationales Privatrecht undbffentliches Recht, in FONFZIG
JAHRE INSTITUT FOR INTERNATIONALES RECHT AN DER UNIVERSITXT KIEL 124-41 (1964);
see also K. Zweigert, Droit internationalpriv et droitpublic, REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PRIVA (R.C.D.I.P.) 645-66 (1965).
42. Preliminary Draft, E.E.C. CONVENTION ON LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTS AND
NON-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS, ART. 7.
[Vol. 5
The Territoriality Principle
When the contract is also connected with a country other than
the country whose law is applicable under Articles 2, 4, 5, 6, 16, 17,
18 and 19 (3), and the law of the other country contains rules which
govern the matter compulsorily in such a way as to exclude the appli-
cation of any other law, these rules shall be taken into consideration
to the extent that the exclusion is justified by the particular character
and purpose of the rules.
43
Since the issue here also concerns the welfare of the state, a strong
argument could be made that the territoriality principle applies to these
cases just as it does to state encroachments on private rights. To the
extent that the foreign state has the power to enforce its will, particu-
larly over property located within its borders, the foreign public law
should be applied; otherwise not.
IV. CASE LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
EXPROPRIATION
A. The Law of German-Speaking Countries
1. Switzerland
It took a long time for the Swiss Bundesgericht to give up the idea
that foreign public law is never applicable. Professor Lahve of the
University of Geneva came out strongly against this position at the
Wiesbaden Conference of the Institut de Droit International.' In any
event, the Swiss Bundesgericht will not recognize foreign expropriations
of property located in Switzerland.
In the case Vereinigte Carborundum- und Elektritwerke v.
Eidgenossisches Amtftr geistliges Eigentum,45 the court stated:
[A]I property is subject to the sovereignty of the State in which
it is located, and its expropriation by another State constitutes an
infringement of that sovereignty. There is therefore no need to de-
clare such acts to be generally legal. If the State on whose territory
the property is located considers that expropriation of that property
does not violate its interests, or that its expropriation should be rec-
ognized for special reasons, it can take appropriate action. From the
point of view of international law, the territorial state is not bound to
recognize the expropriation by a foreign state unless it has agreed by
43. Id
44. Lalive, LApplication du droif public &tranger, 56 ANNUAIRE INSTITUT DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 229 (1975). See also id, Point II, at 552.
45. Judgment of Sept. 25, 1956, 82 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts
[BG] 1 196, 23 I.L.R. 24 (1956).
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treaty to do SO.
4 6
The Swiss Bundesgericht reaffirmed this basic outlook in the controver-
sial Zeiss47 case:
In the instant case the question is not whether to apply and en-
force the public law of the German Democratic Republic in Switzer-
land. The expropriated property was located in the East Zone [of
Germany]. No one can expect a Swiss court to assist the German
Democratic Republic in its attempts to get others to recognize an ex-
traterritorial expropriation ordered by its authorities, especially when
the property in question is located in Switzerland.48
On March 27, 1973, the Superior Court of Ziirich rejected the peti-
tion of the Republic of Ghana to be relieved of the necessity to post
security for court costs in a case in which Ghana was requesting the
court's assistance in recovering the amount of a bribe which had been
paid to a Ghanian official and which had been declared as due and
owing to the Ghanian state. The court said:
Decisions of foreign states of a public law nature are categori-
cally denied enforcement in Switzerland (Guldener, Max, Das inter-
nationale und interkantonale Ziviorozessrecht der Schweiz, Zuirich:
Schulthess, 1951, p. 97, note 35), and an attachment pursuant thereto
is also impermissible. If the defendant (State) has attached in Swit-
zerland the property which is the subject of this litigation, it must
expect that it will not be treated any better with regard to the duty to
post security than it would be if it had made the attachment relative
to a private law claim. The security must therefore be posted.49
2. Austria
In a decision rendered on 1 October 1959,50 the Austrian Adminis-
trative Court rejected the complaint of a Czech State administrator act-
ing as transferee of the assets of a nationalized mining company.
(Czechoslovakia was the nationalizing state.) The complainant ob-
jected to the appointment of an Austrian administrator over the com-
46. Id at 199 and 25, respectively.
47. Judgment of March 30, 1965, 91 BG 1 117; Lalive, Drolt internationalprivk, 23
SCHWEIZERISCHES JAHRBUCH F0R INTERNATIONALES RECHT 183 (1966).
48. Id at 130-31 and 191, respectively.
49. Blatter flr ZUrcherische Rechtsprechung 72, No. 14, at 23 (1973); Lalive, Drolt inter-
national privk, 30 SCHWEIZERISCHES JAHRBUCH FOR INTERNATIONALES RECHT 205, 280
(1974).
50. Judgment of Oct. 1, 1956, No. 5062A A.S. 721-22 (1959), 28 I.L.R. 16 (1963).
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pany's Austrian assets. In finding the complaint inadmissible, the court
said:
We find that according to the rules which have secured general
recognition in public and private international law, the effect of con-
fiscatory measures taken by a State (nationalization) does not extend
to assets outside the borders of that State ...
.. . Such a measure (confiscation) always takes place when the
former owners are deprived of their property by State action without
payment of compensation. In such cases the State action must be
denied recognition outside the borders of the State concerned,
notwithstanding the existence of a promise to pay compensation, as
long as compensation has not in fact been paid in the amount pro-
vided. It is not disputed that hitherto no payment has been made to
shareholders of Austrian nationality, either individually or in pursu-
ance to any international agreement.
The complainant has attempted to prove that such measures by
foreign States are not contrary to the Austrian ordrepublic because
Austria herself has taken confiscatory measures since the end of the
Second World War. This argument can be countered by saying that
the rule of non-recognition of confiscations of private property with-
out payment of compensation beyond the borders of the confiscating
State constitutes a generally recognized rule of international law
which must be applied by this court independently of the question of
whether the legislation of the forum State itself has invariably ad-
hered to that rule. In ruling on the complaint now before the court, it
is therefore unnecessary to inquire whether the strictures directed
against individual pieces of Austrian legislation are justified, because
the answer to the question of the effect in Austria of measures of
nationalization taken by the Republic of Czechoslovakia, which
must be decided in accordance with rules of international law, does
not depend on such a consideration.
5 1
The Austrian Supreme Court later took the same position in a sim-
ilar case involving the establishment of an association of shareholders
(communio incidens) to look after the Austrian assets of a foreign na-
tionalized corporation:
According to the constant jurisprudence of the Austrian
Supreme Court the confiscation extends only to the assets located
within the territory of the confiscating State, and not to the Austrian
assets of the company. The decisive factor is the confiscation without
payment of compensation, and not the legal form in which the con-
51. Id at 14.
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fiscation was effected.5 2
This was in accord with an earlier decision reached by the same
court: "Every act of a foreign state intended to deprive a person of his
economic or legal rights through nationalization is only territorially-
restricted to the territory of the confiscating state--effective."5 3
The court had an opportunity to refine these ideas in a 1965 case:
The Austrian Supreme Court has developed settled case law
holding ineffective foreign confiscations of property located outside
the confiscating State. However, in view of the territorial sovereignty
of the confiscating State, it would appear to be stretching this princi-
ple too far to apply it in cases involving property located within the
confiscating State at the time of the confiscation but which later left
the country.54
Doubts concerning the question of whether an association of
shareholders (communio incidens) of a Czech corporation possessed ca-
pacity to be sued were dispelled by the court, which stated:
The Austrian Supreme Court is of the opinion that foreign ex-
propriations without compensation are contrary to Austrian ordre
public and will not be recognized regardless of whether the confisca-
tion involved the whole corporation or only its shares, and regardless
of the nationality or domicile of the shareholders affected. Such
State action is effective only within the territory of the confiscating
State."
But the existence of a treaty may change matters. In applying the
Austro-Czechoslovak Property Treaty of 19 December 1974,56 the Aus-
trian Supreme Court said:
It is not necessary for us to decide here who would basically be
regarded as the owner of property located in Austria. The Austrian
Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed the opinion that it should
be a communio incidens, an association of the partners, shareholders
52. Judgment of April 19, 1961, Oberste Gerichtshof (Austria) [OGZ.Austria], Ev. Blatt
No. 354 Osterreichische Juristenzeitung (1961), 40 I.L.R. 16 (1970).
53. Judgment of March 6, 1963, OGZ.Austria, 95 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL
142 (1968).
54. Judgment of Dec. 22, 1965, OGZ.Austria, 94 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL
941 (1967). See also the decision of April 6, 1965 involving a communio incidens to manage
the Austrian assets of a Czechoslovakian corporation, 94 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL 941 (1967).
55. Judgment of Dec. 9, 1965, OGZ.Austria, reprinted in Judgment of March 3, 1967,
OGZ. Austria, 10 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 143, 145 (1969).
56. Austro-Czechoslovak Property Treaty of Dec. 19, 1974, 451 Bundesgesetzblatt fur
die Republik Osterreich 1965.
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and other possible members of the former juridical person. Accord-
ing to Faschings,57 property located within the country is "to be
treated like any other type of legal entity which is vested by the na-
tional legal system with the capacity to sue and be sued." Beitzke5 s
speaks in terms of a "special property" since here it is not a "com-
munio incidens" of members of the former nationalized entity that is
being sued as party defendant (the public administrator would lack
representative capacity for this) but rather each and every entity pos-
sessed of legal capacity to sue and be sued 59 over which Dr. G. M.
has been granted administrative responsibilities, and that includes
"the property of the former Raiffeisen savings bank located in Aus-
tria . .. " (as is stated in the already cited text of the decree ap-
pointing the administrator). The only "party defendant" here is thus
the above described "special property" and not the previously al-
leged communio incidens.
The sole consideration in determining the legal basis for recog-
nizing that such a "special property" possesses the capacity to sue
and be sued is the existence of this "special property." Should the
"special property" disappear, so also would all possibility of its being
able to participate in litigation.
In Article 3(1) of the Austro-Czechoslovak Property Treaty of
19 December 1974,60 Czechoslovakia assigned to the Republic of
Austria all proprietary rights and interests located in Austria of
which Czechoslovakia had claimed ownership based on Czech con-
fiscation and nationalization decrees. These rights were effected as of
the date of the treaty, 9 September 1975, in the name of Austria as
well as Czechoslovakia. Question of whether the Republic of Austria
"took over" the Czech legal position entirely (as several deputies crit-
ically remarked during parliamentary debates on the treaty),6 ' and
thereby tacitly recognized the confiscatory policies of Czechoslovakia
aimed at property located in Austria (which would mean a departure
from prior existing adherence to the territoriality principle), or
whether the Republic of Austria, despite the "assignment" to it, man-
aged to maintain the territoriality principle. In favor of the latter, it
would have been more appropriate to utilize phraseology which
would have assigned the property in question "to the disposal" of the
Republic of Austria. In both instances, the general assignment in
57. 2 H.W. FASCHINGS, KOMMENTAR ZU DEN ZIVILPROZESSGESETZEN 117 (1959).
58. 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 178-83 (1960).
59. See 41 SAMMLUNG ZIVILRECHTLICHER ENTSCHEIDUNGEN 132 Ev. Blatt (1976-81).
60. Austro-Czechoslovak Property Treaty of Dec. 19, 1974, 451 Bundesgesetzblatt fur
die Republik Osterreich 1965.
61. See XIII Gesetzgebungsperiode des Nationalrats, 146th and 150th Sessions, at
14116 and 14629, respectively.
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Article 3 (1) of the Treaty of all properties described therein, includ-
ing the "special property" of the former Raiffeisen savings bank
which existed until 9 September 1975, had the effect of "extinguish-
ing these proprietary rights as such, thus also eliminating any possi-
bility that the 'special property' of the former Raiffeisen savings bank
might have legal capacity to sue and be sued.62
3. Arbitration Tribunals within the Framework of the Austro-
German Property Treaty
There are two binding opinions rendered by the arbitration tribu-
nals established pursuant to the Austro-German Property Treaty of
June 15 195763 which addressed themselves to the problem of the terri-
toriality of nationalization.
In Mannesmann A G Dsseldorf v. Dr. Berchiold und Buchsbaum,'
the defendant challenged the legal standing of Mannesmann AG Dfts-
seldorf to sue. The plaintiff in turn desired to prevent the defendant
from using the name "Mannesmann" and related company insignia.
The defendant alleged that Mannesmann AG Dusseldorf was not the
legal successor to Mannesmann AG Berlin, which had been dissolved
in East Berlin. The arbitration tribunal stated:
The seizure of the plant of the co-plaintiff in Berlin-Adlershof
by the Russian occupation forces the subsequent transfer of this plant
to a state enterprise had no legal effect whatsoever on the plaintiffs
property in the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria. In both
the law of nations as well as in private international law and interna-
tional administrative law the effect of sovereign State action is gov-
erned by the principle of territoriality.
Confiscatory measures taken against private property, whether
clothed in the form of a statute or carried out by administrative ac-
tion or sheer physical force, encompass only that property which is
subject to the territorial sovereignty of the confiscating State, and do
not have any extraterritorial impact. That is why in the case ofjurid-
ical persons it is irrelevant whether the confiscatory measures were
directed at the property of the juridical person or at participatory
rights in such a person. In both instances the rights of the original
owners of the corporate assets outside the territory of the confiscating
62. Judgment of June 29, 1976, OGZ.Austria, 27 OSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
OFFENTLICHES RECHT 336, 339-340.
63. Austro-German Property Treaty of June 15, 1957.
64. Special ed. No. 6 to pt. IV, Nos. 51-52 Wertpapier Mitteilungen [WM] 19 (Feb. 15,
1962) (binding opinion No. 28); I. SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, THE AUSTRIAN-GERMAN ARBI-
TRAL TRIBUNAL 138, 140-41 (1972).
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State remain undisturbed. An additional rather technical legal prob-
lem is thus posed, namely, whether this property belongs to the origi-
nal owners as a communlo incidens without its own legal personality,
or whether the old corporation continues to exist with regard to the
seized property.
65
In the second binding opinion, W. Schulz, A. Hillmann und W.
Schulz & Co., Bad Liebenau (BRD) v. G Wurzer, Wien,66 the arbitra-
tion tribunal discussed the question of whether the plaintiffs could val-
idly press a claim of the firm W. Schulz und Co., which originally had
its head office in the German Democratic Republic, (East Germany)
against the defendant if the firm W. Schulz und Co. had retained its
head office in East Germany:
According to the so-called principle of territoriality, acts of ex-
propriation are effective only within the territory subject to the juris-
diction of the taking State. Within the sphere of the free States, ordre
public shall be opposed to the expropriations connected with the so-
cializations in the Eastern Zone.
67
4. West Germany
As evidenced by the following citations, the territoriality principle
is well established in Germany. Foreign public law will not be applied
to determine domestic legal relations in conflict of laws situations:
a) The applicability of the Soviet Zone currency regulations to de-
termine the legal relations of the parties does not depend, as the ap-
pellate court found, on whether the loan relationship is governed by
Soviet Zone or West German private law. Such a way of looking at
the matter fails to take into consideration the basic difference be-
tween private and public conflict rules. It would mean that the pub-
lic law of a foreign State or of another legal system, at least in cases
where the public policy exception of Article 30 of the Introductory
Law to the Civil Code is not applied, would determine domestic legal
relations with reference to the principles applicable to private inter-
national law. There is no support for this view in West German posi-
tive law today.
The conflicts rules of private law, circumscribed by provisions of
customary or statute law, are founded on the idea of the recognition
65. I. SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, supra note 64, at 140.
66. Special ed. No. 2 to pt. IV, No. 13, WM 5 (Feb. 24, 1964) (binding opinion No. 50);
I. SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, supra note 64, at 164-66.
67. Id
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and application of foreign private law.6" In the field of contract law
the principle of party autonomy is widely recognized. The point to
be stressed here is that the primary purpose of our system of private
law is to strive for justice between individuals.
6 9
The territoriality principle will be applied by German courts
where foreign public law is sought to be asserted as governing an extra-
territorial dispute:
By way of contrast, the conflicts rules of public law are impreg-
nated with the idea of terrritoriality. They are subject to the princi-
ple that the provisions of public law have basically no effect outside
the borders of the legislating State.70
b) This principle of non-applicability of foreign public law, which
the Federal Supreme Court has recognized repeatedly in case law
involving the international and interzonal law of expropriation,
71
must be applied in the instant case involving a loan relationship to
the extent that the validity of the assignment of the claim depends on
the construction of the transfer restriction provisions of the Law of 15
December 1950.
To be sure, the transfer restriction provisions of foreign law (es-
pecially assignment prohibitions, which by their nature pertain to
public law) may serve exclusively or predominantly to protect indi-
vidual interests or to strike an equitable balance between them. It is
also not beyond the realm of peradventure that under certain circum-
stances such public law, despite its territorially restricted character,
may be permitted to exercise a certain influence on internal private
law relationships.
72
Where foreign public law serves to advance incompatible eco-
nomic and political goals, the courts have held that public law conflicts
rules will be applied:
The legal outcome would be different, however, if a public law
transfer restriction served not to achieve a significant balance of the
private interests of the parties, but rather to accomplish the economic
and political goals of the legislating State. In such a case, because of
its incompatible purpose, the public law norm would have no inter-
68. Einige Grenzfragen des ordrepublic in Fllen entschddigungsloser Konfiskation, [1954]
SCHWEIZERISCHES JAHRBUCH FOR INTERNATIONALES RECHT 91, 93.
69. H. SOERGEL, W. SIEBERT & G. KEGEL, supra note 9, preliminary comment to art. 7,
comment III(l)(a)(ii) and comment VI(2)(b,bb).
70. Einige Grenzfragen des ordrepublic in Fdllen entschiddigungsloser Konflskation, supra
note 68.
71. See 9 BGHZ 34,38 (1953); 12 BGHZ 79, 84(1954); 18 BGHZ 1, 8 (1956); 23 BGHZ
333, 336 (1957); 25 BGHZ 127, 129 (1958); and 25 BGHZ 134, 143 (1958).
72. See 80 BG II 53,61 etseq.
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nal effect on the private contract relationship it pretended to govern.
Instead, the legal relationships in question would be governed only
by the law of the State which, based on private law conflict rules, is
found to be competent. As a matter pertaining to international ad-
ministrative law, the effectiveness of the transfer restriction, which
was intended to achieve State interests, is governed by public law
conflict rules.
73
c) In accordance with the public law conflict rule of territoriality,
the effect of the Law of 15 December 1950 is basically limited to the
area of the Soviet Zone. Courts of the Federal Republic of Germany
only have to respect and execute the statute if and to the extent that
the authorities in the Soviet Zone are in a position to enforce its pro-
visions.74 Such is not the case here because the instant claim is gov-
ered by the applicable rules of Federal German law.75 Such
sovereign interference in private claims is justified by the fact that the
interfering State is only able to enforce its decrees against those who
are subject to its power, e.g., those judgment debtors who reside
within the State's jurisdiction.
76
The territoriality principle will be applied in other areas of the law
besides expropriations:
These principles are not limited to expropriations. They are also
applicable to legal restrictions on the transfer of currencies. This is
so since otherwise the right of the creditor to enforce his claim in
accordance with local private law would be restricted or defeated,
with the result that the substance of the claim would thus be affected
by a public law intervention outside the territorial sovereignty of the
Soviet Zone. The courts of the Federal Republic are not authorized
to enforce a rule having such an extra-territorial effect.77
However, treaties may override these principles where applicable:
d) The applicability of the territoriality principle in cases of this
type may be restricted by the terms of an international treaty, such as
73. H. SOERGEL, W. SEIBERT & G. KEGEL, supra note 9; but see, Judgment of Reichs-
gericht, 15 JPRspr 15 (1930); L. RAAPE, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 345 (1977); A.F.
SCHNITZER, 2 HANDBUCH DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS, 775, 778, 786 (1958).
74. Judgment of June 27, 1928, 121 Reichsgericht in Zivilsachen [RGZ] 337,344 (1931);
Judgment of Nov. 14, 1929, 126 RGZ 196, 264 (1931). See also H. SOERGEL, W. SIEBERT &
G. KEGEL, supra note 9.
75. Judgments of July 11, 1957, 25 BGHZ 127, 129 (1958), 25 BGHZ 134, 139 (1958);
see also § 23 ZPO.
76. 9 BGHZ 34, 39 (1953).
77. See Judgment of April 6, 1951, Dist. Ct. of Kiel; E. RIEZLER, INTERNATIONALES
ZIVILPROZESSRECHT UND PROZESSUALES FREMDENRECHT (IZRspr) 349; see also Judgment
of June 4, 1948, Dist. Ct. of Hanover, IZRspr 332.
No. 2]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944.78 However, this restriction is
inapposite here since the Soviet Zone is party to no such convention.
It is only in this connection that the contrary views developed by
Zweigert 79 and Wengler s° disregarding the territoriality principle
and applying the currency regulations of a foreign State are to be
evaluated.8'
Consistently, however, in the area of attempted foreign expropria-
tion of property located within West Germany, the public law of the
expropriating state is given no force:
The confiscatory measures of Czechoslovakia can have no effect
on property located outside Czechoslovakia and which is currently
the subject of this law suit. It makes no difference whether the res
expropriated was only the property of the cooperative (as found to be
the fact by the appellate court) or whether the decrees of 19 May and
25 October 1945 also perpetrated an expropriation of the member-
ship rights of the shareholders concerned (as the Federal Supreme
Court assumed.)8 2 Even under the latter broader interpretation,
property located outside Czechoslovakia would not be affected by the
confiscation.
8 3
Where expropriation of property of a corporate entity is attempted
by a foreign state, West German courts have held the corporation to be
"divisible" with the result that the West German corporate property is
beyond the reach of the expropriating state:
a) The Federal Supreme Court has consistently held that Soviet
Zone expropriation measures have no effect on property located in
the Federal Republic. Thus, a company expropriated in the Soviet
Occupation Zone continues to exist in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many to the extent that it has property here.
8 4
b) The property of a juridical personality and the person itself may
also be split when all or almost all of the membership rights in it are
78. See STAUDINGER, KOMMENTAR ZUM BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH (llth ed.),
§ 134, n. 20.
79. Zweigert, Die NichteriDIung auf Grund ausidndischer Leistungsperbote, 14 ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FOR AuSLNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 283, 290, 295, 298
(1948-49).
80. Wengler, Die Anknapfung des zwingenden Schuldrechis im internationalen Pripat-
recht, 54 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 168, 211 (1941).
81. Judgment of Dec. 17, 1959, 31 BGHZ 369, 370-73 (1960).
82. Judgment of July 11, 1957, 25 BGHZ 134, 144, 146 et seq. (1958).
83. But see Judgment of May 5, 1960, 32 BGHZ 256, reprinted in Judgment of Oct. 6,
1960, 33 BGHZ 195, 197 (1961).
84. See Judgment of Feb. 22, 1971, WM 723 (1971).
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expropriated.85 Should this occur to a company with its head office
in the Soviet Occupation Zone, company property located in the
Federal Republic is deemed to belong to a so-called "divisible com-
pany" legally distinct from and composed of the former members of
the expropriated company.
Nor may an expropriating foreign state legitimatize its claims in a
West German proceeding by clothing the expropriation in the garb of
"private law":
c) In this regard expropriatory measures include not only sovereign
acts but also those which tend to exert an expropriatory impact, al-
though not designated as expropriation and outwardly appearing to
be of a private nature.8 6 The appointment of receivers, administra-
tors or corporate officers may thus be regarded as an expropriation,
depending on the purpose, extent, actual impact and duration of the
interference.8 7 In cases, however, where no disguised or otherwise
factually accomplished deprivation of property is apparent, but
rather where only measures of a temporary nature have been taken,
these measures will normally have a territorially restricted effect, at
least where they are not blatantly provisional. Thus, for example,
official decrees pertaining to property located in another jurisdiction
are ineffective or in any case require special recognition by the sover-
eign concerned. 8 They do not, however, result in the splitting of the
company property or of the company itself.
German courts extend these protections to participatory share-
holders' rights:
The decisive factor in evaluating foreign expropriatory measures
is that such compulsory sovereign acts can have no extraterritorial
effect.8 9 This is an expression of the general principle of the non-
applicability of foreign public law, to the extent that it promotes
political or economic policies.90 If, to continue with this reasoning,
the expropriation of all or almost all of the membership rights is to-
85. See Judgment of March 31, 1971, 56 BGHZ 66, 69, WM 535 (1971); Judgment of
Oct. 6, 1960, 33 BGHZ 195, WM 1272 (1961); Judgment of May 5, 1960, 32 BGHZ 256, 261,
WM 717 (1960); Judgment of Feb. 20, 1961, WM 423 (1961).
86. See Judgment of Jan. 30, 1956, 20 BGHZ 4, 10, WM 349 (the first PREVAG deci-
sion); see also Judgments of Feb. 20, 1961, WM 423 (1961); Dec. 18, 1963, WM 734 (1964);
42 BGHZ 1 (1963); Nov. 12, 1959, WM 1456 (1959); 31 BGHZ 168 (1960).
87. H. BEEMELMANS, DIE GESPALTENE GESELLSCHAFT 90 (1963).
88. See Judgment of May 10, 1955, 17 BGHZ 209, 212 (1955), WM 1021 (1955); Judg-
ment of July 11, 1957, 25 BGHZ 134, 150 (1957), WM 995; and judgments reported in WM
846 (1957) and WM 668 (1969).
89. Judgment of Nov. 29, 1965, WM 221, 223 (1966).
90. Judgment of Dec. 17, 1959, 31 BGHZ 367, 370 etseq. (1959), WM 370 (1960).
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day regarded as tantamount to a territorially limited attack on the
company itself, this is because experience has shown that some States
have been very active in appropriating to themselves corporate assets
by the indirect means of confiscating the shares of the corporation,
leaving intact the corporate juridical personality.91 Since this led to
attempts, aided by the notion that the corporate shares are located at
the head office of the corporation, 92 to extend the effect of the expro-
priation beyond the borders of the acting State, it seemed necessary,
in choosing between a [formalistic] legal construction and a realisti-
cally related application of the territoriality principle, to opt for the
latter.
93
It should be noted, however, that adequate grounds for so decid-
ing only exist where participatory shareholder rights have been ex-
propriated to such an extent that the corporation has itself
economically been expropriated, with the taking of shareholder
rights employed only as an indirect means to achieve this goal.94
Where, however, only certain shares have been expropriated, other
States need not regard this as an interference in their sovereign con-
trol over local property rights. In such a case, these proprietary
rights belong not to the members as individuals but rather to the
company, which continues to exist as a private economic enterprise.
The preservation of sovereignty does not necessitate here forcing
those members who were not affected by the expropriation to accept,
possibly against their will and interest, a splitting of the company
and thus also of their shares, a circumstance which could trigger dis-
astrous economic consequences.95 It is not necessary for us to decide
here whether or not an expropriated minority can ever be helped.9 6
In another decision,97 the German Supreme Court held that in-
tangibles are accorded protection from foreign expropriation:
91. Seidl-Hohenveldern, Volkerrecht, Verfassungsrecht und Spaltungstheorie, WM 770,
772 (1967); L. RAAPE, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT (5th ed. 1961) 683.
92. Judgment of July 11, 1957, 25 BGHZ 134, 148 (1957), WM 995 (1957).
93. Judgment of May 5, 1960, 32 BGHZ 256, 261 (1960), WM 717 (1960); See also
Kuhn, Die Enteignung deutscher Beteiligungen an i'sterreichischen Aktiengesellschaften mit
deutschem Vermigen, WM 2, 8 et seq. (1956); Schulte, Die "Spaltgesellschaft" als rechts-
methodisches Problem, 19 NFEU JURISTICHE WOCHENSCHIr 521 (1966); see also Judgment
of Jan. 30, 1956, 20 BGHZ 4, 12 et seq. (1956), WM 349 (1956).
94. Kuhn, supra note 93 at 2, 8, and 10.
95. Stocker, Territorialifitsgrundsatz, Vorbehaitsklause, Eigentumsgarantie (1964) WM
530, 538; Stocker, Aussenprivatrechtliche Grundlagenprobleme und inliindischer Enteignungs-
schutzftr AMinderheitsaktionare, deren Gesellschafisanteile durch auslindische Staaten konfts-
ziert werden, (1965) WM 442, 444; Mann, Die Konfiskation von Gesel/schaften,
Gesellschaftsrechten und Gesellschaftsvermigen im internationalen Privatrecht, 27 RABELSZ 1,
43-44 (1962-63).
96. See H. BEEMELMANS, supra note 87, at 81 and 83; WM 670, 674 (1966).
97. Judgment of Feb. 28, 1972, WM 394 et seq. (1972).
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In accord with the principles of international order, German
case law pertaining to interstate and international legal relations rec-
ognizes the effectiveness of such foreign compulsory measures only
to the extent that they affect objects within the jurisdiction of the
acting sovereign. In favor of the defendant it may be assumed that
the expropriatory features of Order No. 167 also included the admin-
istrated loan claim which the Leuna Works in Merseburg had against
the defendant, as evidenced by the temporary continued payment of
interest to the Soviet authorities. Nevertheless the principle still ap-
plies that such foreign compulsory measures affect only that property
of the debtor which is located on the territory of the expropriating
State and are not effective against property located elsewhere.
98
The measures directed against the company, as is always the
case in expropriations of private law juridical personalities, were not
able to touch its property in West Germany. The company continues
to remain the owner of this property, as has consistently been held by
the case law of the Federal Supreme Court.99 In the meantime this
company has effectively established its head office in the Federal Re-
public and is identical with the plaintiff.
In cases of claims, although the situs of the claim normally is the
domicile of the debtor, the territoriality principle is applied to limit the
effect of expropriation of property of a juridical personality:
In accordance with the "territoriality principle," compulsory
State expropriations have no effect outside the expropriating State
because the legislative competence of every State ends at its borders.
Obviously, the question is how these principles affect the instant
claim. The expropriation of property will thus be recognized only if
the expropriated property is located within the expropriating State.
In cases involving claims, it is normally assumed that the locus of the
claim is the place where the debtor has his domicile or residence.
For juridical personalities as debtors, it is the place where the head
office is located. If one were to therefore recognize the expropriation
as being completely effective here, because the debtor formerly had
its head office in the Soviet Occupation Zone, this would permit the
measures to have an impact on property outside the Soviet Zone.
For in this case the debtor was a company which had considerable
98. See Judgment of Feb. 11, 1953, 9 BGHZ 23, 28 (1953); Judgment of Jan. 30, 1956,
20 BGHZ 4, 10, WM 349 (1956); Judgment of Feb. 18, 1957, 23 BGHZ 333, WM 390 (1957);
Judgment of July 11, 1957, 25 BGHZ 134, WM 995 (1957); Judgment of May 5, 1960, 32
BGHZ 256, WM 717 (1960); Judgment of Oct. 6, 1960, 33 BGHZ 195, WM 1272 (1960);
Judgment of March 31, 1971, 56 BGHZ 66, WM 535 (1971).
99. See Judgment of May 5, 1960, 32 BGHZ 256, 259, WM 717 (1960); Judgment of
Oct. 6, 1960, 33 BGHZ 195, 198 etseq., WM 1272 (1960); and Judgment of May 27, 1957,
WM 846 (1957).
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property also outside the Soviet Zone, namely in the territory of the
present Federal Republic of Germany, and which it is continuing to
operate here. If the territoriality principle is really valid, that is to
say, an effect on property outside the borders of the expropriating
State will not be recognized, then the seizure of a claim cannot ordi-
narily be conclusive and the effectiveness of an expropriation of the
claim cannot therefore be accepted, because at the time of the State
action the debtor had his domicile or head office within the territory
of the expropriating State.
In applying the territoriality principle to East European expro-
priations (and also in general), the Federal Supreme Court has said
that the decisive factor is not the seizure of a claim but rather
whether it pertains to property located outside the expropriating
State. 1o
Intellectual property is similarly protected. In the Solzhenitsyn
case' 01 ("14th of August") the Federal Supreme Court explained the
limitations of extraterritorial application of Soviet copyright laws:
3. Contrary to the opinion of the appellate court, the existence of a
State foreign trade monopoly in the U.S.S.R. does not prevent us
from giving legal effect to the demand contract. To be sure, the State
foreign trade monopoly prohibits a copyright holder possessing So-
viet citizenship from gainfully exploiting his rights.'0 2 Such foreign
public law prohibitions, regardless of what State's law would be ap-
plicable to govern issues involving the conclusion of the contract, are
basically restricted in their effectiveness to the territory of the foreign
State in question. Public conflicts law is ruled by the territoriality
principle.' 3 This is so, as the Federal Supreme Court has indicated,
at least as to those foreign public law currency restrictions which
serve, not to protect private interests, but rather to advance the eco-
nomic and political goals of the legislating State. The latter happens
to be the case here. The concentration of all foreign trade in the
hands of the State (or in certain entities determined by it) is essen-
tially a political-economic decision serving to accomplish the goals of
State economic planning. For this reason the effects of the State mo-
nopoly of foreign trade in the U.S.S.R. are basically limited to the
territory of the U.S.S.R. Article 25 of the Basic Law (Federal Ger-
100. See Judgment of Feb. 18, 1957, 23 BGHZ 333, 336 (1957), WM 390 (1957); and
Judgments of May 27, 1957 and July 4, 1957, WM 846, 1001 (1957). But see Bundesarbeits-
gericht No. 2 on Internationales Privatrecht Arbeitsrecht and H. SOERGEL, & W. SIEBERT &
G. KEGEL, supra note 9, nn. 516, 532 and 542 to art. 7.
101. Judgment of April 16, 1975, 64 BGHZ 183, 188-90.
102. See D. Loeber, Sowjetunion Einfdhrung, P. MHRING, E. SCHULZE, E. ULMER, & K.
ZWEIGERT, QUELLEN DES URHEBERRECHTS 9 (1961).
103. Judgment of Dec. 17, 1959, 31 BGHZ 367, 371.
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man Constitution), which requires observation of general rules of in-
ternational law does not, according to Blumenwitz,' 4 relate to the
foreign trade monopoly of the Soviet State ....
The courts of the Federal Republic thus have to respect and en-
force the State foreign trade monopoly of the U.S.S.R. only and to
the extent that the authorities of the U.S.S.R. are themselves in a
position to carry out its principles.1
0 5
In a case involving the expropriation of claims, the Federal Labor
Court declared:
Polish or French legislation can expropriate and thereby liqui-
date claims only insofar as its legislation is effective. Expropriatory
legislation is no longer effective and valid outside the territory of its
enactment (territoriality principle). Therefore the claim owned by a
German living in the Federal Republic is not affected by the ex-
propriatory legislation of another State. If a German creditor domi-
ciled in the Federal Republic has been expropriated in a debtor State
(here Poland or France) and he has another debtor or attachable
property otside the debtor State, his claim to that extent has not
been expropriated.' °6 The only controversy here involves the so-
called "divisible" expropriation of a claim. The plaintiff, domiciled
in the Federal Republic, is pressing a claim against a debtor which
cannot be affected by any type of Polish or French expropriatory leg-
islation. The plaintiff has found in the Federal Republic property
against which it may proceed, namely, the rights which the defendant
has to the redemptive values which the Federal Debt Administration
has distributed.10 7
In a plenary session the Federal Supreme Court had an occasion
to apply the territoriality principle in interpreting the Allied High
Commission Statute' 8 as it related to a Dutch expropriation of Ger-
man shares in a corporation. The court began its analysis with a gen-
eral discussion of the territoriality principle.'09
The starting point for an analysis of the scope of the Statute is
the objective status of the law before the Statute was enacted, that is,
before 1951. Since the Statute is connected in point of time with the
law as it then existed, we must start from there.
a) At that time the territoriality principle, which set clear limits to
104. See amicus brief submitted by Blumenwitz on June 13, 1972, at 16-17.
105. Judgment of Dec. 17, 1959, 31 BGHZ 367, 372.
106. See H. SOERGEL, W. SIEBERT, G. KEGEL, supra note 9, comments 537-43 to art. 7.
107. Grunsky & Wuppermann, AP No. 159 Ruhegehalt in IPR spr 386 (1972).
108. Allied High Commission Statute (Allierte Hohe Kommission Gesetz [AHKG]) 63.
109. Judgment of May 21, 1974, 62 BGHZ 340, 343-45.
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uncompensated expropriations (confiscations) of the property of for-
eigners, was generally and universally recognized." It provided
that such sovereign acts of a State could only affect property located
within that State, but not elsewhere."'
The court then discussed the situations in which the territoriality
principle applied:
The limitations inherent in the territoriality principle apply (and
always did apply) not only when the property of a juridical personal-
ity is expropriated, but also to confiscations of the membership rights
in a juridical person, at least when the corporate shares are (as here)
all or almost all owned by foreigners." 2 It is only natural that in this
type of case the law considers the seizure of the membership rights to
be tantamount to the seizure of the juridical person. It thus cannot
reach any further than could an ordinary confiscation of foreign
property. To do otherwise in cases of this type would be to disregard
and, by artificial legal reasoning, to eliminate the territoriality princi-
ple entirely, as exemplified by the seizure of all or almost all of the
available membership rights in a juridical person instead of its prop-
erty. It is not right to evaluate the scope of the respective expropria-
tion in both cases differently and to apply the territoriality principle
to one and not to the other. This corresponds to international legal
thinking from the time that the territoriality principle was generally
accepted, that is to say, before the Statute went into effect ...
The court next discussed the "divisibility theory" and its relation-
ship to the territoriality principle:
c) The so-called "divisibility theory" is irrelevant to a determina-
tion of the status of the law before the Statute went into effect. In
accordance with this theory, which took on its present form around
1952 (after the Statute was enacted), a "divisible company" is created
when an expropriation decree fails to effectively transfer all of the
affected company's property to the expropriator.' The "divisibility
theory" applies only to the consequences of the confiscation, to the
extent that these pertain to company property located outside the
confiscating State, regardless of whether the confiscation is directed
against the company itself or against membership rights in it. In or-
110. Beitzke, Probleme der Enteigung, FESTSCHRIFr FOR LEO RAAPE 93, 102-03 (1948);
see also Judgment of Nov. 12, 1959, 31 BGHZ 168, 171.
111. See Judgment of July 11, 1957, 25 BGHZ 127, 129; Judgment of May 5, 1960, 32
BGHZ 256, 259.
112. But see Judgment of March 31, 1971, 56 BGHZ 66, 69.
113. See I. SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, INTERNATIONALES KONFISKATIONS-UND ENT-
EIGUNGSRECHT 105, 127 (1952); see also Judgment of July 11, 1957, 25 BGHZ 134, 144;
Judgment of May 5, 1960, 32 BGHZ 256, 260.
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der to answer the question (which is decisive here) of whether and to
what extent uncompensated expropriations can in any way affect
company property located abroad, the "divisibility theory" must nec-
essarily refer back to the already existing and internationally recog-
nized territoriality principle.
Finally, in another decision,"1 4 the Federal Supreme Court took
this position on the expropriation of claims and the "divisible
company":
2. . . . [T]he appellate court did not err in approving the creation of
a "divisible company."
b) The Federal Supreme Court has consistently held that the pri-
vate law consequences of State expropriations and seizures end at the
borders of the acting State. Foreign expropriatory measures thus af-
fect only that property which is located in the territory of the expro-
priating State, and not that which is located in Germany.' 15 The
property which remains unaffected by the expropriation or seizure
does not become ownerless. Rather, the pre-State action owner con-
tinues to be the legal owner. In cases, as in the instant suit, where the
owner is a juridical person, this corporate form continues to exist for
this purpose. 16 The same result would be forthcoming if the foreign
State expropriated not only the property of the juridical person, but
also (as in the instant case) the membership rights in it. 117 If the CB
Company in Belgium should be completely dissolved (say through
winding up), the result, contrary to the view of the defendant, would
be no different. For even in this event the CB Company would con-
tinue to exist for the purpose of exercising ownership rights of that
part of its property not affected by the seizure and expropriation.' 
18
The question of whether the CB Company has property in Ger-
many to justify the plaintiffs continued existence as a "divisible com-
pany" is governed by German law. 1 9 Both the case law of the
114. Judgment of May 5, 1977, WM 730.
115. See Judgment of May 21, 1974, 62 BGHZ 340, 342, WM 969; Judgment of Jan. 21,
1965, 43 BGHZ 51, 55, WM 227; Judgment of July 11, 1957, 25 BGHZ 134, 140 and 143,
WM 995 etseq.; Judgment of July 11, 1957,25 BGHZ 127, 129, WM 1047; Judgment of Feb.
25, 1960,32 BGHZ 97, 99, WM 489; Judgment of May 5, 1960,32 BGHZ 256, 259, WM 717.
See also 1 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES OBERSTEN GERICHTSHOFS FUR DIE BRITISCHE ZONE IN
ZIVILSACHEN (OGHbrZE) 386, 390; H. SOERGEL, W. SIEBERT, G. KEGEL, supra note 9,
comment 555 to art. 7.
116. See Judgment of July 11, 1957, 25 BGHZ 134, 143 et seq., WM 995; Judgment of
May 5, 1960, 32 BGHZ 256, 261, WM 717; Judgment of Jan. 21, 1965, 43 BGHZ 51, 55 et
seq., WM 227; Judgment of Nov. 29, 1965, WM 66, 221-22.
117. See Judgment of Feb. 25, 1960, 32 BGHZ 97.
118. See Judgment of Oct. 6, 1960, 33 BGHZ 195, 199, WM 1272.
119. See Judgment of July 11, 1957, 25 BGHZ 127, 129, WM 1047; Judgment of July 11,
1957, 25 BGHZ 134, 139, WM 995; Judgment of May 5, 1960, 32 BGHZ 256, 259, WM 717.
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Federal Supreme Court and the overwhelming majority of legal
scholars identify the locus of a claim as the domicile of the debtor.'
20
The same basic concept is found in the provisions of section 23(2) of
the German Code of Civil Procedure.
It is another question whether the loan claim has not been af-
fected by the seizure and expropriation to the extent that the defend-
ant had property in Belgium which could. be used to satisfy the
claim. 12  We need not answer this question since the existence of
possible Belgian State action would not change the fact that the
claim had its locus in the domicile of the defendant in Aachen. 122
c) On appeal, the defendant is attempting to invoke the territorial-
ity principle and to apply it to the facts of this case. His attempt must
fail, however.
cc) To be sure, in its decision of 13 December 1956123 the Federal
Supreme Court declined to apply the territoriality principle. That
case, however, dealt with Dutch legislation expropriating corporate
shares located in Germany but which the Allied Occupation Powers
had handed over the the Dutch government. These facts, of course,
are quite different from those in the instant case, where there has
been no such handing over.
124
The latest comprehensive analysis of the territoriality principle in
the German international law of expropriation is given by Stoll.'"
B. Romanist Law
1. France
In Fondation Carl Zeiss Sftung v. Fondation Carl Zeiss
Heidenheim,2 6 the Cour de Cassation said in a 1966 decision involving
the expropriation of trade marks:
Having held. . . that the trade marks in issue had been regis-
120. See Judgment of Feb. 1, 1952, 5 BGHZ 35, 37; Judgment of July 1957, 25 BGHZ
134, 139, WM 995; Judgment of Nov. 12, 1959, 31 BGHZ 168, 171 etseq., WM 1456; Judg-
ment of May 5, 1960, 32 BGHZ 256, 259, WM 717; see also 1 OGHbrZE 386, 391 et seq.; L.
RAAPE, supra note 91, at 674, 677; M. WOLFF, DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT
DEUTSCHLANDS 153 (3d ed. 1954).
121. H. SOERGEL, W. SIEBERT & G. KEGEL, supra note 9, at 541; Wengler, Die
Belegenheit Yon Rechten, in FESTSCHRIFT DER JURISTISCHEN FAKULTAT DER FREIEN
UNrVERSITXT BERLIN ZUM 41, DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAG IN BERLIN 285, 336 et seq. (1955).
122. Wengler, supra note 121, at 336.
123. Judgment of Dec. 13, 1956, WM 56 (1957), also reported in MONATSSCHRIFT FOR
DEUTSCHES RECHT 276 (1957), with comment by Beitzke.
124. Judgment of May 5, 1977, WM 730.
125. See H. STOLL, STAUDINGERS KOMMENTAR ZUM BGB, comments 197-221, 3-125 of
Part II on the Introductory Law (EGBGB) (1976).
126. 47 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 129, 132 (1974).
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tered in France, the Court could deduce that this localisation of the
trade marks had rendered inoperative in France all the measures of
appropriation which occurred in the German Democratic
Republic. 127
In many cases French courts have decided that a nationalization is
only effective in the nationalizing state; therefore the expropriated
party remains liable for debts incurred in France with regard to the
later nationalized property.
Thus, the cour d'appel of Paris said in a case decided on April 11,
1957:
The Egyptian laws providing for the seizure and confiscation of
the property of the royal family apply only to property in Egypt and
are of no effect so far as concerns the application of Article 14 (Code
Civil).
128
In two decisions handed down on April 23, 1969, the Cour de Cas-
sation took the same position relative to the debts in France of refugees
from Algeria: "No legal effect will be given in France to a seizure car-
ried out by a foreign State unless equitable compensation has been pro-
vided in advance."'
129
The same formula, word-for-word, appears in the decision of the
Tribunal de Grande Instance of Paris in the Braden Copper Corporation
case.' 30 The application of the citation in this case, which dealt with
Chilean copper and not with the liability for debts, indicates that not
only is the territoriality principle at stake, but also that expropriations
by a foreign State of property located in its territory would not be rec-
ognized in France because in violation of French ordrepublic.
Boulanger denies that there is any need to recognize extra-territo-
rial nationalizations and considers such recognition highly unlikely
where compensation is doubtful.
131
127. Id at 132.
128. Ex-King Farouk of Egypt v. Christian Dior, S.A.R.L., 24 I.L.R. 228, 229 (1957).
129. Credit foncier d'Alg~rie et de Tunisie v. Narbonne, 96 Clunet 912, 914 (1969); Com-
pagnie franuaise de credit et de banque v. Consorts Atard, 58 Revue critique de droit inter-
national priv6 718 (1969).
130. Corporacion del Cobre v. Soci~t6 Braden Copper Corporation, 100 Clunet 227, 229
(1973).
131. BOULANGER, LES NATIONALISATIONS EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE COMPARE
264 (1975).
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2. Belgium
In a 1947 case, the Cour d'appei of Brussels addressed itself to the
winding up of the affairs of a corporation:
[We have decided] that the contingent claims ... of the Soviet gov-
ernment would involve the application in Belgium of a political
measure taken by a foreign State and could not be entertained by the
Belgian courts.'
32
In a case decided by the Tribunal de commerce of Brussels in 1963,
the court had to consider the impact of an Egyptian law on corporate
shares located in Belgium. Belgian and American shares, belonging to
A, had been transferred for deposit from the Banque de Port Said to
the Banque de la SociWtb Generale in Belgium. A had previously placed
them on a deposit with the Banque de Port Said. In 1959 a receiver was
appointed to take possession of A's property in Egypt. The Banque de
Port Said opposed A's demand that the Banque de la Socte Generale
hand over his shares to him because of the appointment. Nevertheless,
the court ordered that the shares be delivered to A by the Banque de la
SociWtb Generale in Belgium. In its decision the court said:
It follows that only Belgian law is competent to govern the legal
incidents of the contested shares and that the ... Egyptian law can-
not extend its effect onto corporeal property located in Belgium.
133
3. Netherlands
In 1959, the Superior District Court of Amsterdam decided a case
dealing with Indonesian nationalization of the Dutch account of a for-
mer Dutch firm. In its decision the court remarked on the territoriality
principle:
[Tihe measures of control and nationalization, also in the view
of the Bank Indonesia, have only territorial effect. All six lots of
tobacco, however, had already been shipped to the Netherlands,
before the above mentioned Act on Nationalization of Netherlands
Enterprises of December 31, 1958 entered into force, even though it
did so retroactively on December 3, 1957.134
After decades of controversy, the First Department of the District
Court of 's-Hertogenbosch handed down a decision in 1975 which
132. Judgment of June 25, 1947, Cour d'appel, Brussels, 77 Clunet 864, 884.
133. Judgment of May 16, 1963, Tribunal de commerce Brussel [1947], III Pasicrisie
Beige 124 (1963); 92 Clunet 687 (1965).
134. Judgment of June 4, 1959, 30 I.L.R. 28, 32.
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finally brought to an end the litigation involving the Czech nationaliza-
tion of the Dutch firm Bata. By invoking the territoriality principle, the
court dismissed the complaint of the Czech successor state enterprise:
Whereas the court, in line with a large number of authors, as
indicated in the papers of the defendant, and on the basis of the opin-
ion submitted by Professor M. Bos, Vice President of the Interna-
tional Law Association, with which opinion the court agrees,
subscribes to the point of view that the nationalization laws in ques-
tion, in the absence of any treaties to the contrary, can have effect
only within the Republic of Czechoslovakia, so that the assets of
Bata A. S. which were located elsewhere were not affected thereby,
and Bata A. S. therefore remained the legal owner of the claim
against defendant situated in the Netherlands.
Whereas even if this were not the case, Netherlands public pol-
icy prevents the enforcement within this country of the nationaliza-
tion of Bata A. S., since it was not effected from the standpoint of a
penal sanction but nevertheless occurred without any real possibility
for the expropriated party to obtain any suitable indemnification, as
has been explained at length by defendant and has not been specifi-
cally denied by plaintiff.
4. Italy
In a 1956 case involving the Zeiss Company, the Appellate Court
of Milan declared:
The confiscation of property without payment of appropriate
compensation is a violation of the Italian Constitution. Since the na-
tionalization or confiscation carried out by the East German govern-
ment is devoid of any effect in Italy, it must be assumed that the prior
existing legal situation will be judicially regarded as valid.'
36
In a 1967 monograph, Mengozzi accepts the territoriality principle,
not as a rule of international law, but rather as a rule of Italian private
international law. 3
5. Brazil
In a 1953 decision, the Federal Appellate Court of Brazil held that
a deposit of shares set up by the Bata firm in Brazil did not belong to
135. Judgment of Feb. 28, 1975, International Legal Materials 669, 676-77 (1976).
136. Judgment of March 27, 1956, reprintedin JANSEN, Volkseigener Betrieb Zeiss Ikon,
Dresden v. Zeiss Ikon AG, Stuttgart, FESTsCHRIFT FOR CASELLI 117 (1958).
137. MENGOZZI, L'EFFICACIA IN ITALIA DI ATrI STRANIERI DI POTESTA PUBBLICA SU
BENI PRIVATI, 322 (1967).
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the Czech state enterprise Bata, but rather to Jan Bata in his own name
and in the name of the other shareholders:
Having found that there had been a confiscation and that this
type of acquisition of property was contrary to the provisions of our
Constitution, the trial court ruled that it could produce no effect in
Brazil where it must be considered null and void. We hereby affirm
since the plaintiff has not proved his case. Brazil has no interest in
the fact that a [foreign] State, on its territory, has taken the property
of its own nationals. What cannot be countenanced, however, is the
granting of legal effect in this country to the confiscation by recogniz-
ing as valid an act prohibited by our Constitution. In the instant case
we see a penetration into our domestic economy by a country which,
although it maintains [diplomatic] relations with Brazil, is subject to
a political and social regime which, if not opposed to, is at least dif-
ferent from ours. The penetration which is being attempted cannot
produce good results. Confiscation, nationalization and the seizure
of property by governmental decree will produce their effects in
Czechoslovakia. In Brazil, however, this type of property acquisition




In a 1952 case involving a controversy between the former Czech
owner of a private corporation and the nationalized state enterprise, the
Court for West Denmark said: "The nationalization decree could have
no legal force as regards the claim on the Danish company."'
139
The Court for East Denmark reached a similar conclusion in a
1955 case in which both the Soviet Trade Representation and the for-
mer shareholders of an Estonian company claimed the right to com-
pany property located in Denmark:
The defendants maintain, and the court agreed, that the fact that
the nationalization has been carried out by taking possession of a
juridical entity does nothing to change the principle that an act of
nationalization can have no effect outside the territory of the nation-
alizing State.
140
138. Judgment of May 26, 1953, R.C.D.I.P. 517 (1955); Diario dajustica, 3789 (Oct. 26,
1954).
139. Judgment of May 12, 1952, 19 I.L.R. 18, 19 (1952); 81 Clunet 480, 482 (1954).




In Estonian State Shipping Co. v. Jacobson,'4' the Swedish
Supreme Court said:
The right [to bank credits in Sweden] claimed by the State Ship-
ping Company derives from a nationalization that has the character
of a confiscation. As such nationalizations cannot be given legal ef-
fect as regards property in Sweden, the State Shipping Company has
not proved a better right to the deposited amount. 42
In a 1954 case the Court of First Instance stated:
Considering the principles generally applicable regarding terri-
torial limitation in international legal relations and having regard to
the nature and purpose of the administration to which the firm oper-
ated by Molnar has been subjected in Hungary ever since September
1948, the compulsory administration cannot be regarded as including
property which was already situated in this country before the ad-
ministration was established.1
43
A similar statement by the Swedish Supreme Court may be found
in a 1961 case dealing with a claim by the Bulgarian State to payment
of Swedish credits of a Bulgarian at the Swedish-Bulgarian Clearing
House: "The present action, therefore, as relating mainly to a foreign
interest of a public law character, should not be considered on its
merits.""
Bogdan, a Swedish scholar, has recently come out in favor of the
"principle of isolation." '145 This principle, which is largely coextensive
with the territoriality principle, is based on the idea that the state of the
forum will normally not enforce foreign expropriatory measures within
the forum state, thus "isolating" them, because it has no interest in so
serving the interests of foreign states.
D. -Anglo-Saxon Law
1. United Kingdom
British courts have rejected attempts by foreign governments to
expropriate ships of their nationality in British waters. In The Jupiter
No. 3, the court said: "[A]s the Jupiter had never been within the juris-
diction of the R.S.F.S.R., it was and could not be affected by the na-
141. Judgment of June 9, 1954, 21 I.L.R. 33 (1954).
142. Id at 35.
143. Judgment of May 26, 1954, 21 I.L.R. 30 (1954).
144. Judgment of March 21, 1961, 47 I.L.R. 40 (1974).
145. BOGDAN, EXPROPRIATION IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (1975).
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tionalization decree of the R.S.F.S.R."' 14 6
In Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart N. V v. Slatford,147 the court
expressly refused to follow Lorentzen v. Lydden 148 and withheld recog-
nition of the precautionary expropriation of the credits of a Dutch bank
in London by the Dutch government in exile.
Russian nationalization measures were basically granted no effect
on the property of Russian companies in England. As the court said in
Cheshire v. Huth:149 "These confiscatory decrees have no extraterrito-
rial effect, though they are effective in Russian territory."'
150
The decisions are also unanimous concerning the non-recognition
of the disposal authorizations of the Commissarial Administrators ap-
pointed by the Third Reich. Thus, in Frankfurther v. Exner,151 the
court said: "Schober would appeal in vain to the courts of this country
to assist him in establishing his claim to property which was, and al-
ways had been, situate within the jurisdiction."'
152
In the same vein the High Court of Justice in Novello & Co. v.
Hinrichsen Edition Ltd 151 concluded: "[T]he courts of this country will
not give effect, so far as regards assets situate within their jurisdiction,
to the law of a foreign country which is confiscatory in policy.'
1 54
2. United States
As enunciated by the United States Supreme Court, the "Act of
State Doctrine" requires respect only for expropriations which have
been carried out in the territory of the expropriating state: 155 "We de-
cide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a
taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign Gov-
ernment . "..."156
This interpretation was followed by the Fifth Circuit four years
later:
Moreover, we conclude that in light of the fact that the govern-
ment of Cuba did not have physical control over the species of prop-
146. The Jupiter No. 3, 3 Ann. Dig. 139 (1927).
147. 1 Q.B. 112, 266 (1951); 18 I.L.R. 171, 183 (1951).
148. See note 31 supra.
149. [1946] 79 Lloyd's List L.R. 262.
150. Id at 849.
151. 1 Ch. 629 (1947); 14 I.L.R. 8 (1947).
152. Id at 644 and 11, respectively.
153. 18 I.L.R. 24 (1950).
154. Id at 26, 27.
155. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); 35 I.L.R. 2 (1964).
156. Id at 428 and 37, respectively.
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erty represented by this claim against Standard Cigar Company, it
would not be a violation of the Act of State Doctrine for the courts to
hold that, had the Cuban government taken all of the steps that its
unlimited power would have permitted it to take, such conduct by
the Cuban government would not be recognized by the United States
Courts. Nothing in the Sabbatino Case requires that the Doctrine be
extended thus far. It should be noted that in the Sabbatino Case the
res that was subject to confiscation by the Cuban government was
physical property present in Cuba; whereas the res here is a credit
owned (sic) by an American company in Tampa, Florida. 57
The rights claimed by Cuban intervenors to credits which had ac-
crued in the United States prior to the date of the appointment of the
intervenors have generally been refused recognition. As stated in F
Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush:"'8
The confiscation of the Cuban properties certainly could not ex-
tinguish their rights to conduct this business here in the names of the
confiscated entities. Otherwise, extraterritorial effect would be given
to the decrees of confiscation in this country, an impermissible result
patently contrary to United States policy and laws.' 59
A similar holding was reached in Menendez v. Faber, Coe &
Gregg,160 a case cited for this proposition by the Attorney General in
his brief to the United States Supreme Court in Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba. 6 The Supreme Court's opinion in
Dunhill dealt only peripherally with the territoriality principle, but did
not in any way place it in doubt.'
62
The uncompensated seizure of the property of the branch of a
West Pakistani bank located in East Pakistan (now called Bangladesh)
by Bangladesh could have no effect on credits owned by the branch in
the United States. In Rupali Bank v. Provident National Bank,'6 3 the
court said:
Since the dollar account was located in Philadelphia the act of
state doctrine does not preclude this court from enforcing the public
policy of the United States and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
157. Tabocalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 714 (5th Cir.
1968); 43 LL.R. 18, 21.
158. 256 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); 42 I.L.R. 41, a 'd 375 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967).
159. Id at 492.
160. 345 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
161. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
162. Id at 685-90, 691 n.8, 697 n.ll, 703-05, 714-18.
163. 403 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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which is vehemently opposed to confiscation without
compensation. 1
64
In a similar case the court rejected the argument that during
World War II the United States had approved extraterritorial
confiscations:
It would hardly be "consistent" with American public policy to
create a special exception for extraterritorial seizures committed in
wartime. Aside from the antagonistic effect which such an exception
would inevitably have on our foreign relations with previously
friendly nations, this court has already recognized that citizens of
friendly sovereigns have a legitimate expectation that their property
interests in the United States will receive the benefit of any protec-
tion our law affords.
165
When a bank in Uganda wanted to recall an irrevocable letter of
credit opened at a New York bank in favor of an Israeli company, re-
ferring to a decree of the Ugandan Finance Minister prohibiting all
payments to Israeli nationals, a New York court recognized the right of
the beneficiary to enforce his claim against the credits of the Ugandan
bank. As the state court explained in J Zeevi & Sons, Ltd v. Grindlays
Bank (Uganda Ltd ):166
Laws of foreign governments have extraterritorial jurisdiction
only by comity. The principle which determines whether we shall
give effect to foreign legislation is that of public policy and, where
there is a conflict between our public policy and application of com-
ity, our own sense of justice and equity as embodied in our public
policy must prevail. It is clear, that no attempted confiscatory or dis-
criminatory act of the Ugandan Government, enforced or enacted
after the issuance-of letter of credit 110/84 could diminish the benefi-
ciary's rights in respect to reimbursement and defendant's funds lo-
cated in New York. . . . Although the letter of credit when made
was valid under the laws of Uganda, by virtue of subsequent govern-
mental action the contract became unenforceable in that country.
This action, however, was of no force in New York and the doctrine
of impossibility of performance lends no comfort to defendant.
Neither does the Federal act of State doctrine apply. The es-
sence of this legal principle is that the courts of this country cannot
question an act of a recognized foreign Nation committed within its
own territory, no matter how grossly that sovereign has transgressed
164. Id at 1290.
165. United Bank Limited v. Cosmic International Inc., 542 F.2d 868, 877 (2d Cir. 1976).
166. 37 N.Y.2d 220, 333 N.E. 168, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1975.).
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its own law. The doctrine is not applicable here since a debt is not
"located" within a foreign State unless that State has the power to
enforce or collect it [citations omitted].1
67
3. Canada
The Supreme Court of Canada rejected an attempt by the Esto-
nian state enterprise shipping line to enforce claims against a vessel
which happened to be in Canada at the time of nationalization, even
though a twenty-five percent compensation was provided in the Esto-
nian nationalization statute. In concurring dissenting opinions, it was
pointed out in Estonian State Cargo and Passenger S.S. Line v. Laane
and Baltser (The Elise):I6 s
Moreover, the Decrees are of an evident confiscatory nature
and, even if they purport to have extraterritorial effect, they cannot
be recognized by a foreign country, under the well-established prin-
ciples of international law.
The effect of the Estonian Nationalization Decree in the Courts
of Canada is a different matter. On October 8, 1940 the ship was not
in the jurisdiction of the new Republic and, therefore, the decision in
Luther v. Sagor has no application as the goods there in question
were at the date of the Decree of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet
Republic within the jurisdiction of that country.
169
E. The Hardtmuth Cases
The position of the courts of several different States on the same
facts was very clearly expressed in the Hardmuth cases. Here, repre-
sentatives of the Hardtmuth Company, which had been nationalized in
Czechoslovakia, filed claims in the courts of countries where the com-
pany had trademark or other types of property rights. This worldwide
litigation resulted in a victory for the company representatives. The
Czech state enterprise entered into a cooperation agreement on terms
favorable to the company representatives.
170
In the case the Belgian Cour de Cassation decided:
[T]hat the Czech nationalization decrees are not intended to reg-
ulate the legal relations and interests of private parties, but to serve
directly by way of confiscation the sole interest of the legislating
167. Id at 899-900.
168. Can. S. Ct. 530 (1949), 15 I.L.R. 176 (Can. S. Ct. 1949).
169. Id at 200, 201.
170. See Die Presse (Vienna, Austria) Feb. 12, 1967, at 11.
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State, a power which it possesses only on its own territory, under the
pain of [otherwise] intolerably infringing the sovereignty of other
States on the territory of which is located property which he legislat-
ing State claims to be subject to its measures.'
7 1
The court thus affirmed similar statements of the Cour d'appel of
Brussels. 1
72
The Cour d'appel of Paris reached a similar decision in 1958:
We further find that the nationalization of the business of the
partnership of Hardtmuth in Czechoslovakia is contrary to French
public policy, and that no effect can be given in France to rights
which are said to have been acquired abroad by reason of such
nationalization. 1
73
So also this statement by the highest Italian appellate court:
Since in fact that property and those rights were unaffected by the
measures of confiscation and nationalization, which had no effect
outside Czechoslovakia, the Court of first instance decided, abso-
lutely correctly, that. . . the fact that there had been no liquidation
did not deprive the partners of the property or the joint power to
dispose of the assets abroad.'
74
Similar decisions were reached by:
- the Appellate Court of Amsterdam on 2 April 1958;
175
- the Oslo City Court on 11 July 1959;176
- the Austrian Supreme Court on 2 June 1958;
177
- the Svea Court of Appeals, Sweden, on 26 February 1962.178
The Swiss Federal Court handed down this decision in 1957:
Czechoslovakia could not confer powers incompatible with
Swiss law on the defendant in Switzerland even by means of expro-
priating the name used by the company. To hold otherwise would
stand in direct contradiction to a well-established rule, namely, that
the Czech expropriation decree, as public law, will not be enforced in
171. Judgment of June 2, 1960, Revue de droit international et de droit compar6 32
(1962).
172. Judgment of March 17, 1959, 46 I.L.R. 31, 36 (1973).
173. Judgment of June 25, 1958, 26 I.L.R. 50, 51 (1958).
174. Judgment of Feb. 19, 1960, 40 I.L.R. 17, 20 (1960) (Corte di Cassazione).
175. Judgment of Apr. 2, 1958.
176. 30 I.L.R. 33, 48-49 (1959) (Oslo City Court).
177. 31 Sammlung der Entscheidungen in Zivilsachen No. 83, 280; Clunet 746 (1962),
reprinted in JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 746 (1962).








The territoriality principle has also been recognized and applied as
a general principle of law by a quasi-international arbitration tribunal.
In concession agreements concluded in 1955 and 1971 with California
Asiatic Oil Company and Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company, Libya
agreed to submit any disputes arising therefrom to a quasi-interna-
tional arbitration tribunal. In 1974 Libya nationalized all the property
of both companies. When the companies desired to open up the arbi-
tration procedures, Libya refused to name the arbitrator which it was
entitled to appoint. Pursuant to the provisions of the concession agree-
ment designed to cover such an eventuality, the companies requested
the President of the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) to serve as
sole arbitrator. In its memorandum of 26 July 1974 to the President of
the I.C.J., the Libyan government argued that the nationalization of the
companies not only rendered their agreements with Libya null and
void, but also destroyed the companies' legal personalities. They thus
were arguably precluded from relying on the arbitration clause. The
President of the I.C.J., Mr. Jimenez de Arechaga, appointed M. Dupuy
(from Nice, France) as sole arbitrator. His arbitral award contains the
following language:
This tribunal cannot recognize nationalization measures of such
radical effect. Even though they extend to all the assets of the com-
panies located in the territory of the nationalizing State, they cannot
claim to have destroyed the companies as legal entities .... [I]t is a
well-known rule that nationalizations produce in principle no extra-
territorial effect, and that they cannot, in any event, affect the exist-
ence of companies as legal entities where such companies do not pos-
sess the nationality of the nationalizing State.'
V. THE RECOGNITION OF THE TERRITORIALITY
PRINCIPLE BY EXPROPRIATING STATES
The hopeless position faced by expropriating States attempting to
obtain physical control over extraterritorially located property which
179. Judgment of Sept. 13, 1957, 83 BGE II 312, 335 (1957); 24 I.L.R. 46 (1957).
180. Texaco/Calasiatic v. Libya (1977), reprinted in 104 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL 350 (1977).
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they have expropriated has prompted courts and ministries to either
decline to bring an action or concede failure in one already brought.
Thus, in a 1948 decision, the Austrian Supreme Court applied the
territoriality principle to restrict to property located in Austria the ef-
fect of a post-World War II Austrian anti-Nazi law (Perbotsgesetz)
which provided for the forfeiture of property belonging to the Nazi
Party and its organizations. In applying this statute to a legacy be-
queathed to the National Socialist Teachers' Association in 1942 the
court said:
According to section 1 of the statute all the property of such
dissolved juridical persons is forfeited as a matter of law to the Aus-
trian State. Since the statute creates property rights in favor of the
Austrian State, no special transfer is necessary. The basic rule gov-
erning the law of property and expropriation is the lex rel sitae.'s '
The statute, therefore, is applicable only to property, whether mova-
ble or immovable, which is located in Austria. With regard to the
instant case, this means that the property of the National Socialist
Teachers' Association (to the extent it is located in Austria), includ-
ing the rights which it acquired under the bequest from Johann K.,
has been forfeited to the Republic of Austria. It constitutes, there-
fore, a substantive legal inheritance of the Republic of Austria, which
is the legal successor of the Nazi Teachers' Association. Property of
the legator located abroad (in Rohle, the Sudetenland) is not affected
by this acquisition.' 2
In a 1957 decision involving the compensated nationalization of
the Greek airline company TAE, the Greek Conseil d'Etat stated:
Since the State action carrying out the expropriation was a tak-
ing of [private] property for reasons of public welfare, it constituted
an exercise of State sovereignty and may therefore basically not be
extended beyond the territorial borders of the State and bring about
consequences there. As a result, the expropriation statute is in force
only with respect to property located within the State which has en-
acted the statute, and is applicable only to such property. The statute
may thus not determine the legal fate of property that was located
outside the acting State at the time the expropriation statute was en-
acted. With regard to this property the owner continues to retain the
right of disposal. For these reasons that part of the expropriatory
statute which purports to reach TAE property abroad is inapplicable.
181. I. KLANG, KOMMENTAR zUM ALLGEMEINEN BURGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH 312.
182. Judgment of March 10, 1948, [1949] Juristische Blttter 70, 71 (1949).
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It follows that the Royal Decree of 28-30 November 1956, which is
based on this legislation, is without effect to the extent that it pur-
ports to expropriate TAE property located in its offices abroad. To
this extent the decree must therefore be invalidated.1
8 3
Similarly, Egypt under Nasser had first attempted to include the
foreign properties of the Suez Canal Company in this nationalization,
but then backed off, even amending the Egyptian statute."8 4
The same result was reached in litigation involving claims filed by
the Egyptian State administrator against French property following the
Suez affair:
Assuming that the forced transfer was intended by the Egyptian
authorities to have an extra-territorial effect, and that this was in ac-
cord with the legal provisions promulgated by them at that time, but
which were however not communicated to this court, [we conclude]
that at least the Zurich agreement expressly provided that it would
apply "only to Egyptian territory."'
' 8 5
For the same reason the Algerian government, convinced that its
legal position was hopeless, finally abandoned its efforts in 1971 to ex-
tend its expropriatory measures to include the Tunesian stretch of a
natural gas pipeline, originally the property of a French company, only
one-third of the length of which ran through Algeria, with the rest lo-
cated on Tunesian soil.1
8 6
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The territoriality principle is an inexact concept. In public inter-
national law it means: State acts (such as legislation, administrative
acts, judicial decisions) which serve to promote, not justice between in-
dividuals, but rather the welfare of the state, are basically effective only
within the territory of the State. State acts which interfere with the
exercise of private rights in order to advance the welfare of the State
(such as, above all, expropriations) will nevertheless be recognized in
the interest of international order (and rules of foreign public law will
183. Judgment No. 690-1957, Aussenwirtschaftsdienst des Betriebs-Beraters 99 (1958).
184. See Lenoir, Dijoud et Tillaye v. Companie Financifre de Suez, France, (1959) 28
I.L.R. 176; Focsaneanu, L'accord ayant pour objet l'indemnisation de la compagnie de Suez
nationalisbpar L'Egypte, ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 161, 193 (1959).
185. Judgment of July 9, 1963, Tribunal de grande instance de la Seine, Annuaire Fran-
qais de Droit International (AFDI) 874, 875 (1964).
186. See Manin, Le Dierend Franco-Algbrien relatf aux hydrocarbures, AFDI 169
(1971).
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thereby be applied) when and to the extent that the acting State has
confined the exercise of its power to its own territory and has not en-
croached upon the territory of a foreign State.
